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INTRODUTIMON

Through legislative initiatives and court decisions, the United
States has attempted to eliminate all barriers based on gender. Discrimination based on gender is unconstitutional and state laws that
grant preferential treatment to one gender over another are subject
to intermediate scrutiny.' Until recently, however, courts were willing
to uphold discriminatory treatment when the classification failed to
perpetuate a stereotype
Courts have refused to apply the stricter
scrutiny standard in the areas of educational diversity,' military combat,4 and prison segregation.'
*J.D. Candidate, Washington College of Law at American University, 1998, B.A., cum laude,The
American University, 1992. I would like to thank Professor AngelaJ. Davis for her guidance and
John and Bear for their support.
1. The Supreme Court first attempted to develop a higher standard of review for gender
discrimination claims in the case of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which
involved a law requiring military women, not men, to show that their spouses were dependents
in order to gain better housing and medical benefits. A plurality of the Court concluded that
"classifications based upon sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subject to strictjudicial scrutiny." Id at 688.
The heightened scrutiny standard was refined three years later in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale
of beer to men under the age of twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen, holding
that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. This test would last until
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), in which the Court held that maintaining an
exclusively male, public military college violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
significantly strengthened the second prong of its review by declaring that "all gender based
classifications today warrant heightened scrutiny." Id. at 2269.
2. SeeAssoclated Gen. Contractors of California v. City and County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that limited gender-based classification was acceptable only if
included members suffer disadvantage related to the classification and if the classification did
not reflect stereotypical notions of women).
3. SeeVorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), a~f'd per curiam, 430 U.S.
703 (1977) (maintaining, by an equally divided Court, a Philadelphia school system that
segregated high school students by gender in two of its four high schools to promote freedom
of choice in education); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S.
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In the area of prisoners' rights cases, courts have been reluctant to
apply Equal Protection analysis altogether, developing instead a
separate standard of review for prison regulations. This standard of
review, until recently, was derived from the Due Process Clause,' and
maintained that prisoners retained some inherent rights. In 1995,
the Supreme Court established a new "hands-off" approach to prison
regulations and asserted that a prisoner only faces a deprivation of
rights when a regulation "imposes atypical and significant hardship..
. in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."' Since then, the
Court has expressed a preference for deferring to the states and to
prison officials in managing the "volatile environment" of prison life.9
Last year, the Court reversed its policy on the issue of educational
diversity and ruled that a state-funded school may not prefer one
gender over another in the interests of educational diversity. In
United States v. Virginia,'0 the Court held that although the State was

willing to establish a women's facility similar to the Virginia Military
Institute ('VMI"), such a facility could never be equal to VMI because
of VMI's history, prestige and the benefits young male cadets derive
from attending VMI. By holding that the alternative women's facility
was inferior to the male facility, the Court rejected Virginia's argument that the admission of women cadets would destroy VMI's

951 (1971) (stressing diversity in education as a legitimate goal justifying discriminatory
treatment along gender lines). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (striking the University's policy of not admitting men into the nursing school where no
male alternative was available and women were not victims of discrimination in the field of
nursing).
4. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (using the statutory combat exclusion to
justify a statute requiring only men to register for the draft); Schlesinger v. Balard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (upholding statutory scheme that automatically discharged male naval officers who
failed to receive promotion from lieutenant to lieutenant commander for a second time within
nine years, but allowing female officers thirteen years to advance between the grades).
5. SeePargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that differing programs
and policies for men and women within prisons did not constitute an equal protection violation).
6. See e.g.Webb v. Lane, 583 N.E.2d 677 (IIl. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the Department
of Corrections' regulation requiring seizure of unauthorized currency from an inmate did not
violate the Due Process Clause).
7. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (stating that "a prisoner
retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
taken from him by law").
8. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1995) (holding that a prisoner's liberty
interest is derived from state law and not from the Due Process Clause).
9. Id. at 2299 (stating that the "hands-off" doctrine is necessary to provide flexibility to

prison officials to handle safety and security issues, and the peneological purpose of prison
discipline, and that courts are ill-equipped and lack expertise in administrating prisons).
10. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter "MI"].

Fall 1997]

WOMEN PRISONERS

unique "rat line" structure." The Court held that even if certain
gender-based stereotypes are true in the majority of cases, they may
not be used when applying Equal Protection analysis.'2
In so holding, the Court applied a new standard of heightened
scrutiny, strengthening the standard by which state action must meet
the stated legitimate interest.' Since the Court no longer recognizes
educational diversity as a sufficient governmental interest to withstand Equal Protection scrutiny, it seems as though gender
discrimination will also vanish from the area of prison segregation.
This comment argues that the VW decision mandates that gender
segregation in the prison system be abandoned. Women and men
are generally housed in different facilities in state and federal prisons, where women receive less programming and training, are farther
away from their families, and are housed without regard to security
level.'" Although the Court has generally applied a "hands-off' standard to prison officials, this comment argues that it is
unconstitutional to house male and female prisoners in prison facilities that are not equal. The comment also argues that if states are
unwilling to improve female facilities, the Court must mandate that
women and men be housed together so that women may benefit
from the same facilities and programming as men.
Part I of this paper examines two cases from the lower courts and
the problems currently faced by women housed in unequal facilities.
Part II discusses possible arguments female prisoners may pursue in
challenging their unequal prison facilities, evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of whether to challenge segregation itself, or
simply the inequality under Title IX. Part III further discusses the
new standard of review developed under the VMI case, and Part IV
argues that given this new standard, desegregation of prison facilities
may be the only way to ensure that women prisoners receive the same
opportunities as their male counterparts.

11. Id. at 2270. Virginia argued that women are less adversarial than men, respond more
sensitively to harassment and require more privacy. This would interfere with the "rat line"
structure, which is "an extreme form of the adversative model, comparable in intensity to
Marine Corps boot camp." Id.
12. Id. at 2280.
13. rd- at 2274.
14. See Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1280 (S.D. Iowa 1995), aFt'd., 69 F.3d 280 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 98 (1996) (discussing the parity of prison policies as it relates
to gender).
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PART I-DECISIONS IN THE LOWER COURTS

On its first day of the 1996 session, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case filed by inmates of the Iowa Correctional Institute for
Women." These women prisoners unsuccessfully argued in the court
below that women prisoners deserve educational and vocational
training opportunities equal to those afforded to male inmates pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This was not the first time that a class of women prisoners asserted such a claim, 7 nor was it the first time such a claim was
denied. It is possible that the Supreme Court will soon be faced
with this issue again."
The claim itself presents interesting Constitutional questions regarding the standard of treatment owed to women in a correctional
setting, and whether correctional facilities may be segregated by
gender at all. In Pargo v. Elliott, the plaintiff class of inmates at the
Iowa Correctional Institute for Women ("ICIW") sought declaratory
and injunctive relief by claiming that the policies, programs, services,
and facilities at the state's only all-female correctional institution,
differed substantially from the nine male facilities in the state." In
deciding upon this claim, the district court first sought to determine
whether the women prisoners were "similarly situated" to the male
prisoners who allegedly received preferential treatment." The district
15. Id.

16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (stating "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
17. SeeWest v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994) (challenging the State's ability to preclude women from participation in a male only Boot Camp
Incarceration Program); Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (challenging disparities between male and female inmates' work release, vocational training,
recreational opportunities, wages, health care, and access to an adequate law library); Bukhari
v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162 (ED. Va. 1980) (challenging the differing treatment of men and
women in the same custody level); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(alleging differences in educational and vocational programming, adequacy of facilities, prison
industry work rates, and work pass programs); Barefield v. Leach Civ., No. 10282, slip. op.
(D.N.M. Dec. 18, 1974), cited in, Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079 (alleging constitutional violations
in educational programming, conditions of confinement, and the administration of prison
regulations).
18. See Glover v. McGinnis, 117 S. Ct. 67, 136 (1996), dismissing appealfrom, Glover v.
Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich.1979) (refusing to review a case which alleged differences in programs for male and female inmates).
19. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (noting a possible appeal to the Supreme
Court).
20. Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1252-53 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (discussing that the women
did not challenge the segregation of prisoners by gender but the difference in policies, programs, services, and facilities between the male and female prisons).
21. See id. at 1252. (discussing the application of the correct standard to apply to the facts
in determining whether the female prisoners were similarly situated to the male prisoners).
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court used population levels of the respective facilities, average security levels of the prisoners, types of crimes committed, and the
average length of the sentence as factors for deciding whether male
and female inmates were similarly situated to each other.' In addition, the district court considered "special characteristics"' of the
populations, concluding that the women were "more likely to be
single parents with primary responsibility for child rearing"'2 and
men pristended to be victims of sexual or physical abuse, whereas
26
oners were "more likely to be violent and predatory.
After considering all of these factors, the district court determined
that the female inmates were not "similarly situated" to male inmates
in the Iowa Department of Corrections system and that any differences in programs 7 were a direct result of differences in the
populations. 8 Because the court found that female prisoners were
not similarly situated to male prisoners, it determined that no Equal
Protection claim existed. 29

22. See id.
at 1254 (stating that these factors may be inherently unfair since women facilities
are generally smaller and encompass many security levels). As Appendix A to the Court's
decision which showed, 300 women are incarcerated in the Iowa prison system comprising only
six percent of the total prison population. See Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d
727, 731- 32 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995) (using these same factors to
decide if women prisoners were "similarly situated" to male prisoners).
23. Pargo,894 F. Supp. at 1261 (noting that female inmates may have "special needs" that
require different programs from male inmates).
24. Id. See also Anne Hawke, Alternative Sentences:A just Women's Issue, NAT'L LJ.(Jan. 1996)
at A19 (finding that "of the 90,000 female inmates in the U.S. today, approximately 67% are
primary or sole caretakers" for their children).
25. Pargo,894 F. Supp. at 1261 (despite noting that female inmates were more likely to be
victims of sexual abuse and therefore different from male inmates, the court acknowledged that
ICIW did not have a sex abuse treatment program for its inmates. This was because administrators stated that there was no need for such a program. The court, however, failed to see that
the lack of need indicated that the female inmates were not so dissimilar to the males.).
26. Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1261 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (quoting Klinger 31 F.3d at
731-32). See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990) (using the average age of an
inmate and the number of violent events, escapes and contraband to determine if inmates were
similarly situated).
27. Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1261 (noting that ICIW did offer specific programs to suit the
women on issues such as domestic violence, prostitution, incest, family preservation, anger
management and self-esteem).
28. See id at 1258 (calling the women prison population a "microcosm of [the] entire
prison population," providing greater variety and challenges to prison administrators).
29. Id. at 1252. The court rejected the plaintiff's counter argument that if not similar as a
whole, the women prisoners were similarly situated to the men as divided by their security
classifications. The court found that female inmates will always be different from male inmates
simply by reason of population size, smaller facilities, and that a better way to determine
similarity is on an individual prisoner's length of sentence and type of crime committed.
Regardless, the court found that no matter how one examined the populations, either by
gender or by classification, female inmates and male inmates were not similarly situated. Id. at
1253-54.
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The district court, however, did not end its analysis there. Rather,
it proceeded to discuss the differences between the male inmate
programs and the female inmate programs to determine if genderdisparate treatment existed based on an invidious purpose" and if so,
if such differential treatment was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.' In deciding this issue, the court gave deference to the
prison 32officials' decisions and, thus, only applied a rational basis
review.

After reviewing all of the programs at ICIW and comparing them to
various programs at male facilities, the court concluded that "the
challenged policies are gender neutral in design and application.""
The court held that prison officials had a legitimate reason for treating male and female prisoners differently.' However, the court
determined that the different treatment was not related to a prisoner's gender."5 For instance, among the challenged policies
considered, the court examined security classification of inmates for
purposes of institutional incarceration.' Classification determines
30. See idat 1254 (explaining that the court used "population, average security levels, types
of crimes, and average length of sentence as key factors" in determining if there was an invidious purpose to the gender-disparate treatment); see also Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff must show that the discrimination has an
invidious purpose).
31. Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1262 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.d
333, 336 (8th Cir. 1994), and noting that a court "must proceed to consider whether differential treatment has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest"). Pargo,894 F. Supp. at
1262. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding a Georgia law that denied a
biological father, but not the mother, the right to recover in a wrongful death action for the
death of an illegitimate child). The "rationally related" standard was developed in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which provides great deference to state regulations.
32. SeePargo,894 F. Supp. at 1262.
33. Id.
at 1264.
34. Id. at 1265.
35. Id.
36. See id.
1265-72 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (examining other policies including: access to courts;
libraries and legal materials; annual classification reviews; screening for jobs; rate of pay for
work allowance; decisions to segregate HIV/AIDS inmates; movie censorship; access to counselors; access to canteens; long-term rehabilitative treatment, educational opportunities and
vocational training; and visitations).
The majority of these policies were substantially equal to the policies of male facilities
and based on the facts cited in the court's opinion, the plaintiffs' claims seemed somewhat
frivolous. For example, the plaintiffs argued that their services to copy legal materials were not
equal to the services provided at male institutions. At ICIW, women must drop off their
photocopying requests to staff, which is done on a first come, first serve basis with priority given
to court documents under deadlines. Photocopying is subject to a limit, but according to an
ICIW librarian, no one has ever reached that limit. On the other hand, some male institutions
impose limits on photocopying while other facilities charge male inmates fifteen cents per copy.
Id. at 1269.
A further example of facts that the court used to show that the female prisoner's claim
was frivolous was based upon the female inmates' argument that they received unequal treatment when it came to watching movies. The plaintiffs contended that they were unfairly
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where an inmate will be housed. It is based on the seriousness of the
offense, an inmate's prior record, and his or her personal and behavioral characteristics.17 The court concluded that these factors were
gender neutral and that both women and men were classified in a fair
manner." The court also stated that prison officials have a legitimate
need to classify inmates in order to accommodate security and rehabilitation interests and that the factors relied upon to classify
prisoners were rationally related to legitimate ends. 9 What the court
failed to recognize was that although there may be objective criteria
in deciding an inmate's security classification, the fact that male
inmates will be sent to one of nine facilities, whereas women will only
be sent to ICIW, is a purely gender-based classification. For the
women prisoners, the security classification is a mere formality when
it comes to deciding where they will be housed.'
The court recognized that there were some differences between
the programs offered at the men's and women's facilities.41 However,
the court determined that there was "substantial parity" between the
programs offered to male and female inmates and that "substantial
parity" was all that was constitutionally required.' Further, the court
determined that educational and vocational training programs did
not have to be equal, but merely substantially similar."
The court held that it was "reluctant to substitute its judgment for
that of prison administrators in reviewing day-to-day program and
treated because movies are censored at ICIW. Although ICIW does show R-rated movies,
administrators ban movies that show explicit violence towards women or depict women as
subordinate. In contrast, at two male institutions, R-rated movies are not shown. Id. at 1271.
Other claims are not frivolous such as educational opportunities and vocational
training and long-term rehabilitative treatment, and those issues will be discussed in the
accompanying text.
37. See id. at 1265 (finding that a person sentenced to prison in Iowa, regardless of their
sex, is assigned a custody score based on written objective standards imposed. The goal is to
.place inmates in the least restrictive security level consistent with [the prisoner's] security and
treatment needs.").
38. Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1265 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that there was no
evidence supporting plaintiff's claim of invidious discrimination).
39. See id at 1278 (noting the legitimate end to be one of security and rehabilitation).
40. See idat 1265 (maintaining that it is the custody score that determines where male and
female inmates will be sent, not gender).
41. See idat 1273 (recognizing the absence of a sex offender treatment program at ICIW,
though present at the male facilities, and noting that the treatment programs for substance
abuse, criminal thinking and special needs were generally shorter at ICIW than at the male
facilities).
42. Id. at 1279.
43. Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1275-76 (S.D. Iowa 1995). Iowa offers some educational and vocational training at all of its facilities, usually in the form of literacy training, GED
or high school courses, and social skills training. The longer courses have been found to be
more helpful to the male inmate in securing ajob after being released. Id.
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management decisions."" It concluded by stating that the plaintiffs
had not established a "similarly situated" relationship and since there
was no evidence of invidious gender discrimination at ICIW, there
was no justified Equal Protection claim.' The court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings and held that any differences
found between the male and female prisons were "rationally related
to legitimate penological interests, such as security and rehabilitation.' '
In Women Prisonersat the Dist. of Columbia, Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia ("Women Prisoners"),47 female prisoners at Lorton

Minimum Security Annex ("Annex"), the Correctional Treatment
Facility ("CTF") and the Central Detention Facility sued the District
of Columbia,' requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from
policies violating the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and Title IX.
The women prisoners argued that because they were women, they
were receiving inferior health care, fewer educational and vocational
training opportunities, and less recreational time than male prisoners
in the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("DOC")."
The district court found that DOC was in violation of D.C. Code Ann.

44. Id. at 1291 (quoting Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir.
1994) and noting that holding prison administrators liable for discrepancies in programming
"may seriously hamper [their] ability to ... adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration"). See alsoTurner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that
when a prison regulation impinges upon a prisoners constitutional right, courts should give
deference to prison administrators by applying a rational basis review). But see Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (distinguishing the issue in Turner that dealt with
the day-to-day operation of a prison, from the issue of general budgetary concerns and policies
of prisons that effect women and not men, and applying heightened scrutiny).
45. Pargo,894 F. Supp. at 1291.
46. Pargo v. Elliott, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1995). Again, the female inmates asserted
that they were similarly situated to male inmates in Iowa either as a whole or by security
classifications.
47. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, Women Prisoners v.
District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).
48. In the original "Women Prisoners"case, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia held that the defendants were in violation of constitutional and D.C. statutory
requirements and issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order to correct the specific violations.
When their motion was denied, defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Stay and/or Modify
the Order and appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals ordered that the case be
held in abeyance pending additional proceedings on the defendants' Motion to Stay in the
district court. The district court then granted a temporary stay for 30 paragraphs of the order
and ordered the parties to negotiate and agree on those 30 paragraphs. The parties negotiated
26 out of the 30 paragraphs. The district court then considered the remaining four paragraphs
concerning health care, apprenticeships and recreation time. Its decision, for the purposes of
this paper, will be referred to as "Women Prisoners.
49. Women Prisoners,899 F. Supp. at 664-65. See also supra notes 23 and 29 (comparing the
alleged discrepancies at ICIW and the male prisons in Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D.
Iowa 1995)).
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§ 24-442' in providing inadequate health care to the women prisoners.?s It determined that improved obstetrical and gynecological
health care and education were necessary to prevent future harm to
the women in DOC's custody."2
The court applied an Equal Protection analysis" to the claims involving educational and vocational training and recreation time. The
court found that the women inmates housed at the Annex were
similarly situated to men housed at the Minimum Facility and women
at CTF were similarly situated to men at Central, Medium and Occoquan by virtue of their custody levels, sentences and the purposes of
incarceration."5 The court held that the DOC provided the women at
Annex and CTF with work details and training,' industries, 7 recreation," and education 9 that were inferior to the opportunities
provided to the men.
50. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-442 (1981).
51. 1&. See also D.C. Code Ann. § 24-442 (1981) (providing that "[The] Department of
Corrections ... shall.. . be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and
discipline of all persons committed to [facilities under its jurisdiction].").
52. See id. at 665 (ordering the following: the defendants shall hire within 90 days a health
educator with appropriate training in obstetrics and gynecology in a half-time position who
shall provide clinical and health education, and an additional nurse practitioner, physician's
assistant with special training in obstetrics and gynecology, or nurse midwife for clinical services
at CTF; and the health educator shall implement an obstetrical and gynecological health
education program and health education materials should be made available in the library).
53. See Women Prisoners,877 F. Supp. 634, 678 (D.D.C. 1994) (showing how originally, the
District Court bypassed the plaintiff' constitutional daims and decided the education issues
under Title IX); see also infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
Title IX to a claim challenging the unequal education and vocational programs for women
prisoners).
54. See id. at 675 (explaining how the female prisoners and male prisoners are similarly
situated at the respective facilities).
55. Women Prisoners at the Dist. of Columbia, Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659,670-72 (D.D.C. 1995).
56. See id. at 670-71 (noting that the women at the Annex are employed as maintenance
workers, housekeepers, clerks and librarians, but do not perform chores like carpentry or
plumbing as the men do at Minimum). The court found that work training opportunities are
often denied to the women at the Annex due to the defendants' inability to complete paperwork, insufficient transportation and failure to adequately publicize the opportunities.
57. See id. at 672 (noting that as for the women at GTF, the opportunity to form prison
industries, defined as businesses conducted by prisoners who sell what they produce to government agencies, which was present at the male prisons, was absent at CTF and that Central offers
ten, Medium two, Occoquan one and CTF none).
58. See id. at 671-72 (finding that the recreational facilities at the Annex were inferior to
those at Minimum without justification and that the women at CTF were only provided one
hour of recreation time a day, which would be considered punishment at the males facilities
where they have two to four hours of recreation a day).
59. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. 634, 659 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting the inequality where
women at CTF have access to only an associate degree, but the men at Central, Medium, and
Occoquan may earn bachelor degrees). But see Women Prisoners,899 F. Supp. 659, 679 (D.D.C.
1995) (ordering defendants to provide access to higher educational opportunities for CTF
women).
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Finding inequalities among the policies and programs at female
and male institutions, the court proceeded to apply heightened
scrutiny.' Under this heightened standard of review, the court held
that the DOC provided no legitimate interest for treating female and
male prisoners 'similarly situated' in unequal ways.6 The court rejected the DOC's argument that the differences in treatment between
female and male prisoners, especially in the areas of recreation,
prison industries and work details, were primarily attributable to
differences in the physical structure of the various facilities.62 The
DOC maintained that the proportion of prisoners to the limited
space, personnel, and other DOC resources placed high demands on
prison administrators' who deserved discretion in deciding and
implementing programs for inmates.
The court rejected the DOC's argument that implementing the
court's order" would cause irreparable damage to the District of
Columbia, diverting necessary funds away from city projects.' The
court concluded that the public interest in having "women prisoners
leave jail reasonably healthy and with the capacity to hold productive
jobs instead of returning to jail for a publicly financed incarceration ' outweighed the interest in saving the public money necessary
to implement the order.

60. See Women Prisoners,899 F. Supp. at 670 (citing Pitts v. Thornburg, 866 F.2d 1450, 145354 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that heightened scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review,
reasoning that the issues in Pitts
involved "general budgetary and policy choices" that were nonadministrative in nature and that equal protection claims, as opposed to personal rights
challenges, deserved a stepped-up scrutiny)); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(holding that classifications based upon gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives). But see Turner v. Salley,
482 U.S. 78 (1978) (applying the reasonableness standard when reviewing prison regulations).
61. See Women Prisoners,899 F. Supp at 671 (stating that "[i]n the area of work training, the
unequal participation of women is due to Defendants' inability to complete paperwork,
insufficient transportation and failure to adequately publicize those opportunities which are
available. There is no important government objective being served." citation omitted).
62. See id at 671-72 (stating that using physical structures to justify disparate treatment
"merely begs the question," and noting that the need for women to acquire skilled details
destroys the physical structure justification).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 676-78 (ordering prison administrators to provide equal opportunities for both
female and male prisoners, including apprenticeships, educational programs and equal
recreation time).
65. See Districtof Columbia:Before the Subcomm. on the District of Columbia of the House Comm. on
Appropriations,104th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1995) (statement ofJohn W. Hill, Jr., Director of Financial Management Policies and Issues, General Accounting Office) (declaring that the financial
status of the District of Columbia has reached the status of insolvency).
66. Women Prisoners,899 F. Supp. at 674.
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The court of appeals vacated the majority of the district court's order.67 The court of appeals decided that, although the lower court
had jurisdiction to decide the constitutional claims asserted by the
plaintiffs, a the threshold question of whether the women prisoners
were "similarly situated" to the male prisoners was wrongly decided by
the district court.' The court of appeals criticized the lower court's
failure to consider the "special characteristics" of the male and female inmates." Noting that there are "striking disparities" between
the sizes of the male and female prison populations,7 the court held
that it is not surprising that there are fewer or different programs
offered at women's facilities. It also criticized what it called a "program by program method of comparison.""s The court found that
contrary to the lower court's holding, a DOC decision to provide
male, not female, inmates access to any given program did not violate
Equal Protection principles.74 It held that giving females access to
such programs would drastically interfere with the duties and responsibilities of prison officials. Instead, the court of appeals opted to give

67. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (vacating those portions of the Order addressing sexual harassment,
obstetrical and gynecological care, population caps, educational and vocational training, fire
safety and recreation time; declaring that the District Court abused its discretion in exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the local claims where the plaintiffs' constitutional claims
represented a new question of law). [Hereinafter Women PrisonersR].
68. Id
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
threshold inquiry in evaluating an Equal Protection claim is ...to "determine whether a person
is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly receive favorable treatment") and applying
that same standard to Title IX cases); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (stating
that the "Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.").
70. See id.
at 925 (finding that eighty-two percent of women incarcerated by the District of
Columbia are single-parents with primary responsibility for their children and only seven
percent are serving sentences for violent crimes); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of gender-based stereotypes when applying an Equal Protection analysis).
71. See id.(noting that Minimum has a population of 936 male inmates, Annex 167 female
inmates and that there are 271 female inmates at CTF compared to 1,373 male inmates at
Central, 1,016 at Medium, and 1,767 at Occoquan).
72. Women Prisoners 1, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (arguing that differences in the
facilities justify] the inferior treatment accorded to women is "notably circular."). But cf id. at
946-957 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (noting that "two people [who] commit the same crime. . . in
all respects-criminal history, family circumstances, education, drug use, ...- they are identical," except for gender, and that "[s]olely because of [gender], they are sent to different
facilities at which the man enjoys superior programming options. ... The anomalous result is
that the more unequal the men's and women's prisons are, the less likely it is that this court will
consider differences in the prison experiences of men and women unconstitutional.").
73. Id. at 924-26 (discussing the comparison of the differences in treatment in prison
programs for men and women prisons).
74. See id. at 926 (declaring that where one facility offers a specific program, another
facility may offer a different program or no program at all without offending the Constitution).
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In cautioning federal
great deference to prison administrators.7
courts to move promptly when confronting serious violations in the
law by local prison officials," the court referred to the recent passage
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.' It held that this legislation was
Congress' attempt to curtail judicial administration in prisons.7
As of this writing, it is unclear how the plaintiffs in Women Prisoners
will proceed.' It is unlikely that this issue will disappear. The VMT
decision gives female prisoners more ammunition for proceeding to
the Supreme Court." If the plaintiffs request certiorari, the Supreme
Court should hear arguments and decide this issue by applying the
standard of review formulated in United States v. Virginia.8 The case of
Women Prisoners,unlike Pargo, involves drastic discrepancies between
the treatment of male and female inmates and would provide a
stronger factual basis 6n which to decide this issue."
75. Id. at 926-27.
76. Id. at 919-20 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 n.16 (1981)); see also, Lewis
v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (stating that "considerations of comity ... require giving the
States the first opportunity to correct errors made in the internal administration of their
prisons"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (maintaining that "the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our
Government, not the Judicial"); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (holding
that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform."); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (arguing that "it is difficult to
imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest.., than the administration of its
prisons").
77. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-77 (1996).
See Harvey Berkman, Prisoners'RightsLawyers Plan Attack on New Law, NAT. LJ., May 20, 1996, at
A14 (explaining that the Prison Litigation Reform Act first requires federal courts to find a
constitutional violation before entering remedial orders or accepting settlement negotiations;
secondly, opens existing orders and consent degrees subjecting them to immediate termination
pending a constitutional violation; and thirdly restricts prisoners' access to courts by abandoning waivers of court fees and requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing in court); see also Prisoners'Rights Legislation:HearingsBefore the Sen. Comm on theJudciay,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Walter J. Dickey, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Wis., Madison)
(advocating that the importance of prison litigation is that it alerts the State to prison conditions and that without access to the courts, many consent decrees that have improved prisoners'
lives would not have been possible).
78. Women Prisoners l, 93 F.3d 910, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
79. SeeToni Locy, Ruling Voided on Treatmentof D.C."sFemalePrisoners;JudgeAbused Discretion,
Appeals PanelSays, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1996, atAl (reporting that attorney PeterJ. Nickles, who
represented the plaintiffs in Women Prisoners,has several options on which to proceed, and
noting that Nickles may return to the District Court and ask for a decision on the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment issues only or seek a rehearing in front of the entire appellate court
with a possible appeal to the Supreme Court, or file a new law suit in D.C. Superior Court).
80. Id.
81. 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275-76 (1996) (requiring the state to show that the "[challenged]
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives'").
82. See supra notes 27, 34, 41 and 47 and accompanying text (stating the differences
between female and male facilities in the cases of Pargo and Women Prisoners, and showing
greater disparity of treatment of women).

Fall 1997]

WOMEN PRISONERS

PART II-POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS IN CHALLENGING INEQUALrIY

A. ChallengingGender-SegregatedPrisons
In both Pargo and Women Prisoners, the women inmates did not
challenge the policy of segregating female prisoners from male prisoners in correctional institutions. Because this facial classification
was not challenged, the courts in Pargo and the appellate court in
Women Prisoners refused to apply heightened scrutiny to any difference which might have occurred in programming.'
The question then becomes whether women would be better off
challenging the facial classification of segregating women from men
in order to be housed with men, where better facilities, services, and
programs exist. 4 Because women comprise only four percent of the
total state and federal prison population," prison administrators are
unlikely to devote a large amount of resources to their facilities and
programs."5 As a result, female prisoners suffer from inferior programs, conditions of confinement, 7 and health care.' Many states
Hence,
only operate one correctional institution for women."

83. See supra note 20 (stating that the female prisoners filed their complaint based upon
the differential treatment they received but not based upon the separations of the sexes).
84. See Rosemary Herbert, Women Prisoners:An EqualProtectionEvaluation,94 Yale Lj. 1182

(1985) (arguing that since female prison populations are smaller than male populations,
segregated female institutions will necessarily be inferior to male institutions because of lack of
funding and other resources). Herbert notes that the underlying reasons cited for segregated
prisons are costs of co-ed facilities, special needs of women inmates, privacy rights, and prison
security. Applying an intermediate standard of review to the segregated prison systems, Herbert
concludes that none of these objectives are sufficiently related to gender-segregation to
withstand Equal Protection analysis. But seeDothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding
that limiting women to competing equally with men for only 25% of the correctional counselors
positions in Alabama prisons by height and weight requirements was permissible, due to the
large number of sex offenders); Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1264 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
(maintaining that women and men inmates were not similarly situated and that differing
programs and policies for women and men did not result in an equal protection violation);
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that segregation of prisons on the basis of gender is clearly constitutional).
85. Nicole Hahn Rafter, Even in Prison, Women areSecond-Class Citizens, 14 Hum. Rts. 28, 28

(1987).
86. Id.

87. See Beverly R. Fletcher and Dreama G. Moon, Conclusions, in WOMEN PRISONERS: A
FORGOTTEN POPULATION, 147, 147-50 (Beverly R. Fletcher, Lynda Dixon Shaver, and Dreama
G. Moon eds.,1993) (noting that due to the small female prison population, little research is
being done on the conditions of confinement of female inmates).
88. See Kim Marie Thorburn, Health Carein CorrectionalFacilities,163 WestJ. Med. 560, 562
(1995) (reporting that a 1992 survey of 85 state and federal prisons indicated that more than
15% did not have on-site gynecological care).
89. AmCAN CORRECTIONAL Ass., 1995 DIECTORY: JUVENILE & ADULT CORRECrIONAL
DEPARTM ENTS., INSTiTUTIONS., AGENCIES & PAROLING AUTHORITIES., (1995) (indicating that
Alabama, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia operate no
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women prisoners are more likely than men to be incarcerated farther
from their homes and familiesr and to spend their entire sentence in
one facility." The existence of only one facility causes women of
different classifications to be housed together and subject to the same
rules, so that minimum risk female offenders are treated in the same
manner as maximum risk female offenders.
Establishing more gender integrated correctional facilities may
help women overcome some of these problems." For instance, if
women were housed in facilities with men based on the types of
crimes committed, security levels, and lengths of sentences, women
would probably have access to treatment programs specifically suited
for them and might have more opportunities for educational and
vocational training." Further, proponents of integrated prisons
maintain that a cross-gender environment is more conducive to
rehabilitation, allowing the prisoner to work on social behavior in a
setting more similar to the outside community.'
It should be noted that there are several disadvantages to an integrated correctional system.'
First, although some reports suggest
that rape and sexual assault is no greater at gender-integrated institutions than at single gender institutions, heterosexual activity has very
female facilities, and that besides Alabama, these states house their women in gender-integrated
institutions).
90. SeeAlex Adwan, Women in Prison;How Long Will Oklahoma Ship PrisonersandDollarsOff to
Texas?, TuLsA WORLD, Mar. 24, 1996, at GI (arguing that the policy of transferring women
inmates out of the state due to lack of facilities in the state, is in total disregard for family values
and motherhood-Oklahoma has recently sent over 130 women prisoners to prisons in Texas,
80% of whom are mothers incarcerated for nonviolent offenses).
91. SeeRafter, supranote 85.
92. See Rafter, supranote 85.
93. See Barry Rubak, The Sexually Integrated Prison, A Legal and Policy Evaluation, in CoED
PRISON 33, 43 (John Ortiz Smyklu ed., 1980) (indicating that integrated prisons benefit male
inmates as well because male institutions generally have a smaller staff to inmate ratio and are
based on stereotypical assumptions that men require less privacy and need retribution).
94. See Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (explaining that women
prisoners may not be housed according to the type of crimes committed or security levels
because there are just too few in number).
95. See Rubak, supranote 93, at 52-53.
96. See Rubak, supranote 93, at 42 (stating that the more natural social environment of
integrated prisons leads to a lower rate of recidivism and giving the following prerequisites for a
successful integrated prison: 1) the prison must be open, that is, the prisoners must be free to
leave on furloughs and work assignments and visitors must be free to enter, 2) the prison
should be a minimum security facility, 3) no more than 500 inmates should be housed there at
one time; and 4) there must be interaction between the genders, claiming that "separating tie
sexes would tantalize, frustrate and spur attempts to break through barriers").
97. See Rubak, supranote 93, at 49 (noting that integrated prisons have higher costs, need
more staff and that male inmates tend to complain about a double standard in disciplinary
matters); see also Herbert, supra note 84, at 1205 (admitting that because of the low numbers of
female offenders any move to integrate prisons now would be detrimental to female inmates).
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different consequences than homosexual activity. For instance,
integrated facilities may produce unwanted or unsupported pregnancies,"5 and may lead to increased prostitution and pimping.' Second,
some argue that the rehabilitation of women prisoners would suffer if
they were housed with the very men who may have played a role in
their incarceration."' Third, the sheer difference in numbers between female and male prisoners would put women in an integrated
Although inteprison at risk of exploitation and physical harm.'
grated prisons may have some rehabilitative benefits, they may
present a new set of problems."°s Further, the threat of unexpected
pregnancies in the correctional facilities context may be enough for
courts to uphold gender segregation.' 3
B. Pursuinga Title IX Claim
Women prisoners can challenge unequal education and vocational
programs under Title IX without challenging the facial classification
Title IX of the Education Amendments of
of gender-segregation.'
98. See KARLENE FAITH, UNRULYWOMEN, THE POLITICS OF CONFINEMENT AND RESISTANCE
136 (1993) (discussing how in some gender-integrated prisons, officials would only give women
inmates who were granted conjugal visits birth control, thereby causing women inmates to fear
their male counterparts). But see Charles F. Campbell, Co-corrections, FCT Fort Worth after Three
Years, COED PRISONs, 83, 89 (1980) (indicating that compared to the outside community, the
rate of unexpected pregnancies in a gender-integrated prison is much lower).
99. See Rubak, supranote 93, at 46 (stating that female inmates 'sell' sex in exchange for
cigarettes and other commodities).
100. See Esther Heffernan & Elizabeth Krippel, A Coed Prison, in COED PRISON, 110, 119
(ohn Ortiz Smyklu ed., 1980) (arguing that women inmates housed at gender-integrated
facilities are lost in the midst of male offenders and have no program of their own in which they
can develop leadership roles and cohesive structures that would provide them with alternative
life-styles).
101. See Herbert, supra note 84 (stating that integration may threaten the safety of women,
but women still deserve better than systematic segregation under the Constitution).
102. There is some evidence that gender integrated prisons may be more concerned with
ending homosexuality in single-gender institutions, than with rehabilitating its women population. See Campbell, supra note 98, at 94 (explaining how the first gender-integrated federal
correctional facility came to be in Fort Worth, Texas in 1971, and stating that the pervasive
homosexuality at single-gender facilities demanded an integrated system: "We found ourselves
strongly subscribing to the notion that heterogeneity was an essential concept for us, and
moreover, that co-correction was an essential ingredient of this heterogeneity and at the same
time dependent on it.").
103. Cf Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that a state
may prohibit all use of public facilities and publicly-employed staff in abortions); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (upholding an Alabama regulation prohibiting women
from working as guards in contact positions at all male prisons asserting that the guard's "very
womanhood would ... directly undermine" security at the male prison).
104. SeeJeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994) (having a case with facts very similar
to that of Women Prisoners, this court applied Title IX to the educational programs in state
prisons); see also Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 210 (W.D. Ky. 1982), vacated on other
grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989) (suggesting further that Title IX, at least in the context of
the prison environment, requires a more demanding level of compliance than the Equal
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1972 provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... .""0 In Jedness v.
Pearce, the court held that under Title IX, state prisons receiving
federal funds had to make "reasonable efforts" to offer the same
educational opportunities to women as to men."° The court based its
holding on the statutory language" 7 and legislative history"' of the
provision."° Some argue that women prisoners would be better off
challenging inequalities in the prison context under Title IX rather
than under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution."0 This
argument is based on the fact that the language of Title IX is a "mirror image " "' of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In applying
Title VI, courts are required to apply strict scrutiny to any action that

Protection Clause because its language is identical to that of Tide VI); Beehler v.Jeffes, 664 F.
Supp. 931, 940, 943 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that female prisoners had a cause of action for
damages against state prison officials under Title IX in light of their allegations of intentional
discrimination).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1990).
106. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1229. See Women Prisoners v. Department of Corrections, 899 F.
Supp. 659, 668 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding, that despite prison officials' argument that Title IX
does not reach prison industries, recreational activities and work training programs, that Title
IX would encompass a "sweep as broad as its language"); see also Christine M. Safarik, Constitutional Laui-SeparateBut Equak Jedness v. Pearce-An Analysis of Title IX Within the Confines of
CorrectionalFacilities,18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337 (1996) (arguing that women prisoners may
seek remedies from discrepancies in prison treatment under Title IX).
107. SeeJeldness, 30 F.3d at 1225 (citing Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-617
(1980) (holding that when a statute explicitly lists exemptions the courts should not imply
others) and noting that Congress twice amended Title IX after commencement of challenges
by women prisoners, by stating that if Congress did not want prisons to comply with Title IX, it
had the opportunity to amend the legislation).
108. Id See also North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (holding that the
words of Senator Bayh, sponsor of Title IX legislation, serve as a statement of the purposes of
Title IX); 118 CONG. REC. S5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (explaining that Title IX is
.an important first step in the effort to provide for the women of America something that is
rightfully theirs-an equal chance ... to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills
with the knowledge that they will have a fair chance to secure the jobs of their choice with equal
pay for equal work").
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (3)-(9) (providing for several exceptions to the Title IX
legislation, with no mention of prisons); see also Safarik, supra note 106, at 343 (stating that
given the extensive list of exceptions to Title IX, "the absence of prisons among them is
noteworthy").

110. See Safarik, supranote 106, at 338 (noting a recent trend with female inmates turning
to Title IX).
111. Safarik, supranote 106, at344.

112. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979) (allowing a woman a
right under Tide IX to pursue a private cause of action against a private university receiving
federal financial assistance, which allegedly denied her admission based on her gender).
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distinguishes individuals on the basis of race."' Courts, however, have
been reluctant to apply strict scrutiny to Title IX challenges.
In the prison context, courts have held either that Title IX does
not extend beyond prison educational programs to recreation and
work details"' or that peneological interests outweigh compliance
with Title IX."' Further, the failure of courts to determine what
constitutes compliance with Title IX in the prison context may deem
its use in program challenges worthless."6
PART II-THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD AFrER VMT

Women prisoners challenging unequal treatment under Title IX
run the risk that courts will not apply the law to prison work training,
recreation and other services provided by prisons."' Therefore, in
addition to arguing for compliance of Title IX, women prisoners
should argue that inferior treatment and facilities at women's prisons
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' Although these claims
have largely been unsuccessful in the past, armed with the tougher
scrutiny established in United States v. Virginia,"' women prisoners
should be more successful in gaining equal opportunities."'
113. The argument follows, that since the language of Title IX is so similar to that of Title
VI, that courts applying Title IX must also use strict scrutiny. See Safarik, supranote 106, at 360366.
114. See WomenmPisonersI, 93 F.3d 910, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that "there are grave
problems with the position that work details, prison industries, recreation, and religious services
and counseling have anything in common with the equality of educational opportunities with
which Title IX is concerned").
115. See supranote 37 and accompanying text. But seeJeldness v. Watson, 857 F.2d 1478 (9th
Cir. 1988), remanded sub nom, Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1234 (1994) (holding that
peneological interests are nota complete defense to Title IX noncompliance). On remand, the
district court ruled that parity of treatment is all that is required in claims brought within the
context of the prison setting under Title IX and "penological necessity" is a "complete defense"
to Title IX disparate impact claims.
116. See Safarik, supra note 106, at 360 (suggesting that a framework of compliance at
women prisons may be based upon women's collegiate sports programs); see also Roberts v.
Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993), affd in part and reo'd in part sub
nom., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993) (establishing the effective accommodation test where each college must satisfy
one the following requirements: 1) grant women the opportunity for intercollegiate-level
participation in numbers substantially proportionate to their prospective enrollments; 2) where
one gender has been underrepresented the institution must show a history and continuing
practice of expanding opportunities to that gender;, 3) if one gender does not demonstrate an
interest or ability for a particular sport, the school must assert what sports are suitable for that
gender and accommodate the gender's interest).
117. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the Title IX
argument).
118. See Rafter, supra note 85, at 28 (noting the increase of class action suits brought by
women prisoners alleging unequal treatment in violation of the Constitution).
119. 116 S. Ct 2264 (1996) [hereinafter "M"]. In this case, the United States sued the
Commonwealth of Virginia alleging an equal protection violation in maintaining the Virginia
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In VMI, the Supreme Court began its Equal Protection analysis by
considering the state interest, holding that a state must demonstrate
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for upholding a genderbased government action.'' In providing this justification, the Court
explained that a state may consider physical differences between the
genders," or may even justify a classification as an attempt to remedy
a past wrong.ss The Court also held that justifications must be genuine'. and classifications that perpetuate the inferiority of women are
illegal."
The Court also explained that "state actors may not rely on overbroad generalizations to make 'judgments about people that are
likely to . . . perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination,"""0
Military Institute (VM)
exclusively for male students. On remand, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia approved a proposed remedial plan which would
establish a 'parallel program' for women at Mary Baldwin College, entitled the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"). United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852
F. Supp. 471, 475 (W.D.Va. 1994), af'd,44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct 2264
(1996).
120. Although the court of appeals decided the Women Prisoners II case after the VMI

decision, it failed to apply the new test to the prison context.
121. VM1, 116 S.Ct. at 2274 (quoting 44 F.3d 1229, 1247 (1995) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting)).
SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that discrimination on the basis
of gender injury selection does not further the state's interest in achieving a fair and impartial
trial); Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a policy of single sex
admission to a state run school of nursing does not compensate women for past discrimination
in a field where there has been no discrimination).
122. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2276. SeeMichael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law imposing liability only on men because women are already deterred from
act by risk of pregnancy); Rosiker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (deferring to Congress in
military affairs by upholding male-only draft since women may not serve in combat positions).
But see International Union, United Auto. Workers, et al. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991) (holding that a gender-based policy of excluding women with childbearing capacity
from lead exposedjobs constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII).
123.

VMT, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (holding that

sex classifications may be used "to compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by
women."); California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (stating that
gender classifications may promote "equal employment opportunity" where such opportunity
was denied).
124. See VfM,116 S. Ct. at 2275 (maintaining that the Constitution will not allow post hoc
reasons for classification and finding Virginia's justification of diversity in education to be
disingenuous because it was not a consideration when VMI was created). Id. at 2279.
125. United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996). But see Brief for the Respondents at 8, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941 and 94-2107) (arguing
that differences between VMI and VWIL "are justified pedagogically and are not based on
stereotypes," stating that VWIL is founded upon the principle that a "woman's place is in the
marketplace and world ofideas").
126. VM, 116 S.Ct. at 2280 (citingJ.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139, n.11). SeeWeinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (relying on Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), as standing
for the proposition that gender classifications based on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations
are unconstitutional); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (categorically rejecting the rationale of a Utah statute that required parents to provide for sons until the age of 21, but for
daughters only until age 18). The State justified the statute on the belief that men require
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suggesting that even though "special characteristics" may be accurate
to the majority of one gender, they may not be considered when
applying the Equal Protection Clause." 7 "[E]stimates of what is appropriate for most women no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average
description."2 ' Quite simply, the individual may not be overlooked
when classifying people on the basis of gender.
After considering the classification and the proposed reasons for
excluding women from VMI, the Court examined the remedial plan'"
of creating an alternative women's institution known as the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL").'° This plan survived the
appellate level, where the court concluded that although there were
differences between VMI and VWIL, the programs were 'sufficiently
similar' to survive an Equal Protection evaluation.""' However, the
Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts erred in providing deferential treatment, rather than heightened scrutiny to VMI's male-only
policy. 32

Upon inspection of the programs, the Supreme Court

determined several key differences between the two schools, noting
that VMI was superior in its military training," facilities," course
offerings,' faculty,"' cohesiveness of its student body,"' and in its
more support than women, because girls "tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and
mentally" faster and "tend to marryearlier." Id at 10.
127. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
128. VAW, 116 S. Ct. at 2284.
129. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (holding that remedies must place
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity in "the position they would have occupied in
the absence of [discrimination]," quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974));
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (stating that a remedy must "eliminate [so
far as possible] the discriminatory effects of the past" and "bar llke discrimination in the
future").
130. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941) (arguing that the burden shifts to the State to justify failure to perform the easiest or
most effective remedy).
131. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471,481 (W.D.Va. 1994), (holding that the
Constitution did not require a "mirror image VMI for women," but must only achieve substantially similar outcomes).
132. United States v. Virginia, 1165 .Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996) (citingJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (holding that heightened scrutiny is required for all genderbased classifications)).
133. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (noting that VMI cadets are subjected to rigorous military
training in the "adversative method," whereas, VWIL students participate in ROTC and are
trained in a "cooperative method").
134. MLat 2284 (finding thatVMI is much larger than Mary Baldwin and includes an NCAAcaliber indoor track and field facility, a number of multi-purpose fields, plus baseball, soccer
and lacrosse fields, an indoor pool and a football stadium, whereas VWIL only has two multipurpose fields and a gymnasium).
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influential alumni network."
The Court determined that these
differences were enough to deem VWIL an unconstitutional remedy.
AlthoughJustice Ginsberg, in writing the Court's opinion, does not
expressly state that the Court uses a more stringent form of "heightened scrutiny," it is clear that the standard of review is more stringent
than the intermediate level of scrutiny previously applied to gender
classifications." 9 Under the previous standard of review, the Court
has upheld almost every gender-based statute as furthering an important governmental interest." In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,4' the Court rejected a nursing school's women-only admission
policy, declaring that "diversity of educational opportunities" is not
an important state interest where the state provides the educational
opportunity to only one gender." VM/ moves substantially beyond
Hogan, by declaring that it is not enough for a state merely to provide
the other gender with educational opportunities, but that those
opportunities must be equal."
PART IV-APPLYING THE VIWSTANDARD OF REVIEW TO SEGREGATED
PRISONS

In applying the VMT standard to the prison context, there must be
an exceedingly important governmental interest not only for segregating prisoners by gender, but also for any continuing discrepancies

135. Id. at 2284 (stating that VMI offers bachelor degrees in liberal arts, biology, chemistry,
civil, electrical, computer and mechanical engineering. VWIL does not have a math or science
focus and to receive an engineering degree a student would be expected to spend two years at
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri and pay the private school's tuition.).
136. Id. at 2287 (determining that the faculty at VWIL has less advanced degrees and are
paid less than the faculty at VMI).
137. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2283 (finding that students at VWIL are only
a small portion of students on the Mary Baldwin campus and are not required to live together
or eat meals together, nor are they required to wear uniforms during the school day, and
therefore do not experience the "egalitarian ethic" that predominates at VMI).
138. Id. at 2285 (noting that Mary Baldwin's endowment is currently $19 million, whereas
VMI's is currently $131 million-the highest among public colleges and universities).
139. See Id. at 2292-2296 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (noting that although Ginsberg twice recites
the Hogan test of intermediate scrutiny, the Court substitutes its own "exceedingly persuasive
justification" test requiring a least-restrictive-means analysis comparable to strict scrutiny).
140. There have only been two exceptions to this---"administrative convenience" and
"diversity in educational opportunities." See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (rejecting rational basis review in diversity in educational opportunities); Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980) (holding that "administrative convenience"
is not an important government interest to support presumption that widows and not widowers
are dependent upon deceased spouse's worker's compensation).
141. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
142. Id. at 724-25.
143. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264,2286 (1996).
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in programs.' The VMT Court held that psychological and sociological differences between men and women could not be considered
when evaluating unequal treatment.'" This means that prison programs based on special characteristics of an inmate's gender are
impermissible.'" Thus, applying VM! in a prison context, traditionally male programs, such as plumbing or carpentry must be offered to
women prisoners as well. Likewise, programs such as dietary planning or parenting skills must be offered to male inmates.
The VAH Court further held that insufficient demand among
women college students for a precise replication of the VMT methodology could not be a factor in an Equal Protection analysis.
Analogously, it may be argued that prison officials may no longer
excuse their failure to offer certain programs at female facilities on
the basis that women prisoners generally lack interest in the subject
matter." Also, women prisoners may no longer be denied equal
opportunities simply because their population size is less than that of
male prisoners.
Taking into consideration VO/'s subtraction of "special characteristics" and demand or population from Equal Protection analysis,
144. It is possible that VMI would not deem segregated prisons unconstitutional. For in
deciding that VWIL was inferior to VMI, the court found that all things being equal, VWIL
could never match the benefits derived from VMI's 157-year history and the prestige which that
carries with it. In the prison context, considerations of prestige and history are irrelevant, so
that if all other things are equal, prisons do not have to be integrated. However, although a
state may properly segregate its prisoners by gender, it does not follow that a state may segregate its prisoners by gender into unequal facilities.
145. United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264,2283-84 (1996). See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25
(holding that it is unconstitutional to exclude qualified individuals based on "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females"). But see Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464
(1981) (finding that men and women are not always similarly situated and that a gender based
classification will be upheld, even if the classification does not apply with precision to every
individual subjected to it). E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981) (holding that men
and women are not "similarly situated" in the context of combat); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347, 354 (1979) (stating that a classification based on real differences between men and women
is valid); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (stating that men and women are not
"similarly situated" with regard to promotions available to them in the Navy).
146. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2284 (ruling that although VMI may not be suitable or desirable to
most women, that fact alone cannot excuse the reality that some women may desire and
prosper from it's curriculum).
147. VAM, 116 S. Ct. at 2280. But see Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 445 (4th Cir. 1995)
(speculating as to whether established rule that "demand is not relevant to an equal protection
analysis" might differ when the State confers not a "civil right" but an "economic benefit").
148. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941) (arguing that policies that restrict opportunities based on gender stereotypes are harmful
precisely because they reinforce restrictive roles for men and women). Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (finding that an applicant pool may be artificially depressed due
to self-recognized inability to meet stereotypical requirement). But see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
283 (1979) (striking an Alabama statute which awarded alimony only against men, warning that
even sex-based statutes designed to mitigate past discrimination "carry the inherent risk of
reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women.").
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Being
women prisoners are similarly situated to men prisoners."
similarly situated shifts the burden to prison officials to justify any
discrepancies in inmate services and programs." Further, under the
VMT standard, such a justification must be genuine and may not
perpetuate women's inferiority.'
The VMI Court rejected the argument that policy and programming decisions should be left to the judgment of professional
Instead, the Court held that where a constitutional issue
educators.'
is raised, judicial determinations are appropriate. Applying this to
the prison context, women prisoners may argue that although the
daily decisions are left to administrators and wardens,'" overall policy
and programming decisions that offend the Constitution should be
handled by the courts."
CONCLUSION

As mentioned above, desegregation of prisons is likely to present
new problems, such as prostitution, increased heterosexual assault
and unwanted pregnancies. However, the community's interest in
rehabilitating and preparing prisoners for life after incarceration far
outweighs the potential hazards. Where it has been shown that
women prisoners receive fewer and also inferior training and programming, it is evident that some steps must be taken to ensure that
women prisoners are given every opportunity that male prisoners are
given to succeed after incarceration.
The Court's "hands-off' approach to prison administration is misWhere the
applied in the area of Equal Protection analysis.
Constitution dictates that women must receive equal treatment, it is
not the place of prison officials to determine otherwise.
The VMJ decision, which rejects the use of stereotypes and promotes the value of the individual, may prove helpful to women in all
areas of society, but will undoubtedly provide the basis for challeng149. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941).
150. Pitt v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989); See alsoWestv. Virginia Dep't.
of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994).
151. VM, 116S. Ct. at2275.
152. VWIL was the brainchild of a special Task Force composed of experts in women's
education who maintained that the cooperative curriculum was best suited for young women to
promote self-confidence and leadership. Regardless, the Court held that the Task Force relied
too heavily on 'fixed notions' of what was appropriate for women students.

153. Seesupra note 44 and accompanying text.
154. SeeWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (holding that prison policies and decisions create protected interests
in the inmate).
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ing unequal treatment in the prison context. The state's interest in
maintaining safety and security in the prison system is not undermined by the inclusion of women in equal training and
programming. Rather, equal treatment should be found to promote
these penal interests. Given that these interests are not sufficient to
permit gender discrimination, women prisoners may be successful in
challenging the disparities now present in the prison system.

